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Abstract
Logics for nonmonotonic reasoning have often been described by the property they lackthat
is, monotonicityinstead of by those they do enjoy. Gabbay, Makinson and Kraus proposed a set
of core properties for inference relations that every nonmonotonic theory ought to have. Yet, there
are some apparently well-behaved formalisms that fail to comply with some of these principles,
such as most defeasible argumentation formalisms. In this article we determine the status of these
core properties in the context of two well-known argumentation frameworks.
Keywords: NONMONOTONIC REASONING, DEFEASIBLE REASONING, ARGUMENTATION FRA-
MEWORKS
Resumen
Las lo´gicas que permiten razonar de manera no-mono´tona suelen ser caracterizadas por la
propiedad que carecencasualmente, la monoton´aen vez de serlo por aquellas que s´ gozan.
Gabbay, Makinson y Kraus propusieron un conjunto de propiedades ba´sicas de las relaciones de
inferencia que toda teor´a no-mono´tona deber´a satisfacer. No obstante, existen varios formalis-
mos aparentemente razonables que no satisfacen algunos de estos principios, por caso la mayor´a
de los formalismos de argumentacio´n rebatible. En este art´culo determinamos el estado de estas
propiedades ba´sicas en el marco de dos populares sistemas argumentativos.
Palabras Clave: RAZONAMIENTO NO-MONO´TONO, RAZONAMIENTO REBATIBLE, MARCOS
ARGUMENTATIVOS
1 Introduction
Logics for nonmonotonic reasoning have often been described by the property they lackthat is,
monotonicityinstead of by those they do enjoy. These theories ourished in the early `80s in
¤Partially supported by CONICET (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient´cas y Te´cnicas de la Repu´blica
Argentina).
response to the challenges incomplete and changing information posed to classic, monotonic ap-
proaches. Several nonmonotonic formalisms were introduced in the literature, such as inheritance
networks, default logic, preferential entailment, autoepistemic logic, and defeasible argumentation
among others. The introduction of these many proposals in such a short span of time made it difcult
to decide which formalism is best suited for a given context.
In a landmark paper, Dov Gabbay [6] pioneered the comparison of nonmonotonic theories with
respect to a set of desirable properties. He endorsed focusing our attention on the properties of the
inference relation induced by the formal theory, that is, the relation between conclusions and the set of
premises supporting them. Further pursuing this approach, rst Kraus et al. [9], and later Makinson
[10], studied the set of core properties every nonmonotonic theory ought to have. These properties
can be roughly divided in the so-called pure conditions, that solely depend on the inference relation,
and those that also interact with the logical connectives.
For any inference relation j» its corresponding inference operator, noted C, is dened as C(©) =
fÁ j © j» Ág. Assuming that © andª are sets of premises, the pure conditions can be dened in terms
of this operator as follows:
Inclusion: © µ C(©)
Idempotence: C(©) = C(C(©))
Cut: © µ ª µ C(©) implies that C(ª) µ C(©)
Cautious monotonicity: © µ ª µ C(©) implies that C(©) µ C(ª)
Inclusion is clearly desirable in the context of any sensible inference relation, as it stands for accepting
those premises upon which we reason. Idempotence states that we have inferred as much as possible,
in the sense that no new conclusions can be obtained from © through multiple applications of C. Cut
ensures that adding known consequences into our set of premises does not give us new information.
In contrast, cautious monotonicity, states the opposite: adding known consequences into our set of
premises does not make us loose information. Finally, those inference relations satisfying all these
properties are called cumulative.1
Some authors have gone a step further, suggesting that every nonmonotonic theory should be en-
gineered around a cumulative inference relation. For instance, Kraus et al. [9] claim that . . . [these
properties] are rock-bottom properties without which a system should not be considered a logical
system. Yet, there are some apparently well-behaved formalisms for nonmonotonic Knowledge Rep-
resentation and Reasoning (KR&R) that do not uphold it. For instance, it is quite startling that most
defeasible argumentation formalisms do not comply with cumulativity, even though those same theo-
ries were also successfully applied to a myriad of complex problems.
Let us delve a bit into this apparent contradiction (that is, having a sensible framework for KR&R
which fails to uphold cut, cautious monotonicity, or both). It can be argued that defeasible argumen-
tation has evolved in the last twenty years as a successful approach for modelling commonsense rea-
soning. With several formalism reported in the literature reaching a mature state [16, 14, 13, 5, 7, 2],
research in this eld has played a major role in the development and deployment of solutions to
tough, complex real world problems involving varying degrees of common-sense reasoning, such as
mediation framework for supporting decision making in groups [8], intelligent systems used in med-
ical research [12], or providing proactive assistance for natural language usage assessment [4]. We
refer the interested reader to the comprehensive survey of applications built around argumentation
frameworks compiled by Carbogim et al. [3].
1for an excellent survey of these and other abstract properties we refer the interested reader to [1].
In these formalisms, knowledge is structured as facts and rules, where facts represent knowledge
explicitly observed and rules capture the relation between some evidence and some conclusion fol-
lowing from it. New conclusions can be obtained chaining rules and facts, much like classical logic.
However, these formalisms also allow a sort of weak or default rules that can be discarded as soon
as new knowledge contradicting them is discovered, clearly giving rise to a form of reasoning that is
indeed defeasible. These rules that can be overruled are usually called defeasible, whereas those that
cannot are called strict. In this context, when we allow the use of defeasible rules in order to reach
a certain conclusion, we obtain arguments instead of proofs. Of course, arguments can also compete
with each other (for instance, when they support conicting conclusions), rebutting or undercutting
one another, hence an argumentation process arises from the search of which arguments should be
ultimately accepted, or warranted. To do so, competing arguments are compared to determine which
one wins and which one is defeated, frequently applying a preference criterion. But defeaters may
as well be defeated by other arguments and this prompts for a recursive analysis which is usually
modelled by a tree or graph structure. When an argument is nally accepted after considering all its
possible defeaters, it is said to be warranted or justied.
Going back to the open question we posed before, that is, how come these formalisms, success-
fully applied to those tough problems, yet fail to uphold cumulativity. Prakken and Vreeswijk in their
survey of argumentation frameworks [15] had the following to say on this regard:
. . . [we have shown] that reasonable argumentation systems with plausible criteria
for defeat are conceivable which do not satisfy cumulativity, so that cumulativity cannot
be required as a minimum requirement for justied belief.
The authors propose a set of intuitive examples to sustain their claim, but they stop short of formally
determining the status of cumulativity in any concrete formalisms. To this end, the purpose of this
article is coincidentally to correct and extend a previous work [17] that addressed cumulativity in a
particular formalism to other argumentation theories. In the following section we introduce several
entailment relations that can be identied in these formalisms, and then in section 3 we proceed to de-
termine the status of cumulativity with respect to all these relations in two well-known argumentation
theories. Finally, section 4 briey summarizes the conclusions reached in this study.
2 Entailment relations in argumentation frameworks
Most formal theories tend to characterize a single entailment relation. Argumentation frameworks,
given its layered architecture, introduce many. Before formally dening each one of them, let us rst
overview some introductory notions, common to every argumentation theory. According to Prakken
and Vreeswijk [15], every argumentation theory:
1. provide an underlying logic,
2. formally dene the concept of argument,
3. capture when two arguments are in conict,
4. also capture when an argument defeats another, and
5. provide a mechanism for determining the ultimate state of arguments.
Every argumentation theory begins by dening an underlying logic where knowledge is initially cod-
ied. Even though these formalisms behave non-monotonically, most of these logics tend to dene
a monotonic entailment. The rationale is that the addition of new premises should allow the con-
struction of new arguments (possibly changing the conclusions sanctioned by the theory as a whole),
without requiring to invalidate previous deductions. These arguments, the second aspect in common,
are usually associated with proofs or deductions in this underlaying logic. In this context, an argu-
ment is understood as a tentative piece of reasoning supporting a given conclusion. However, not
every conclusion drawn on this logic leads to an argument, since these systems usually impose addi-
tional restrictions on those derivations, such as being based on consistent premises, being minimal,
etc.
Regarding the third aspect, every formalism easily allows you to construct arguments for con-
icting conclusions. This relation among arguments is also called attack or counter-argumentation
in some of them. Although the most obvious form of conict is the support of complementary con-
clusions, an argument may conict with another for other reasons, for example, when the rst denies
one of the premises of the second. Considering that this relation only captures disagreement between
arguments, it cannot tell appart successful attacks from those that are not. The relation called defeat,
fourth notion common to every argumentation theory, is a renement of the previous relation that only
reects successfull attacks. Note that this relation captures the conditions under which an argument
is able to deny the conclusive force of another argument, effectively banishing the latter. On some
systems, this relation is called attack as well, or interference. Even though the conict relation is
usually symmetric, the defeat relation is usually not: some sort of argument comparison criterion is
applied to determine which argument prevails in those reciprocal conicts.
Finally, defeat alone is not enough to determine the nal state of an argument, as it only sanc-
tions what the outcome of the conict between two particular arguments is. This key notion, also
common to every argumentative system, is used to determine the set of conclusions sanctioned by the
formalism. Therefore, several alternatives have been explored in the literature, for instance x point
vs. constructive semantics, single vs. multiple state assignments, skeptic vs. credulous semantics,
etc. All these proposals identify at least two disjoint sets: one containing those arguments that are
warranted, and the other containing those that are not. In a sense, an arguments is warranted when
it is not defeated, or when its defeaters are in turn defeated, since defeaters are arguments as well.
Note that this process may continue recursively, as long as additional defeaters of any defeater remain
to be considered. This accounts why warranted arguments are sometime called undefeated in other
theories, though they have been termed justied or active as well.
Warrant clearly constitutes an obviousyet fundamentalentailment relation induced by these
theories, as it is its semantics. Formally speaking, this rst relation only entails those conclusions
that are backed by warranted arguments. We call these warranted inference and denote them as
`W . However, to determine which arguments are warranted the formalism must rst build regular
arguments. The set of conclusions supported by just regular arguments can also be considered as
an entailment relation. We call it argument-based inference, and denote its corresponding abstract
inference operator as A` .
Further pursuing this approach, the previous relation can be easily generalized since arguments
usually impose additional restrictions upon the monotonic entailment used to construct them. More-
over, recalling that rules can be either strict or defeasible, we call those conclusions derived using
only strict rules as strict inference, and those obtained using both strict and defeasible rules as de-
feasible inference. We also denote the corresponding abstract inference operators as `S and `D ,
respectively. Although these two relations look rather simple-minded, they do play a fundamental
role in this frameworks: they provide the building blocks for the more elaborate notions of argument
and warrant.
Having identied these four abstract entailment relations one might wonder whether they satisfy
cumulativity. Given their abstract nature, we need to instantiate them according to the particular
formalism under study. In the next section we analyze two concrete instantiations of these relations,
but before we do so we need take into account the way argumentation frameworks structure their
knowledge, distinguishing facts from rules. That is to say, the previous entailment relations must be
considered as a function from sets of rules and facts into sets of rules and facts. Formally speaking:
1. Strict inference: CS(hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j hF ;Ri `S Ág;Ri
2. Defeasible inference: CD(hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j hF ;Ri `D Ág;Ri
3. Argument-based inference: CA(hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j hF ;Ri A` Ág;Ri
4. Warranted inference: CW(hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j hF ;Ri `W Ág;Ri
3 Selected case studies
In what follows, we analyze how two alternative concrete instantiations of the inference relations
introduced in the previous section behave with respect to the properties of inclusion, idempotence, cut
and cautious monotonicity. Due to space constraints, we can only report our ndings regarding Garc´a
and Simari's Defeasible Logic Programming [7], and Caminada and Amgoud's ASPIC argumentation
framework [2]. The choice of frameworks attempt to reect the wide array of alternatives available
when it comes to reasoning and representing knowledge using defeasible argumentation.
3.1 Defeasible Logic Programming
Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP, henceforth), combines a language similar to the one of logic
programming with an argumentative inference engine [7]. DeLP structures knowledge using a set of
strict rules, denoted as ¦, and a set of defeasible rules, denoted as ¢. Facts, denoting the evidence at
hand, are written as strict rules with an empty body. A defeasible logic program P is dened by the
tuple (¦;¢). The conclusions endorsed by a given a program P are obtained through a dialectical
process which can decide if a given query is warranted by the system. In DeLP, the set of facts F
is composed by strict rules with an empty body and the set of rules R is made of both strict and
defeasible rules. In what follows, for a given set Q, the operators strict(Q) and defeasible(Q) return,
respectively, the strict or defeasible rules in Q.
Strict inference: We say that hF ;Ri `DeLPS Á if, and only if, there exists a defeasible derivation
for Á from the program P = (F [ strict(R); defeasible(R)) (cf. denition 2.5 in [7]) that uses
only strict rules. Accordingly, the notion of strict inference is dened as CDeLPS (hF ;Ri) =
hfÁ j hF ;Ri `DeLPS Ág;Ri.
Defeasible inference: We say that hF ;Ri `DeLPD Á if, and only if, there exists a defeasible derivation
for Á from the program P = (F [ strict(R); defeasible(R)) (cf. denition 2.5 in [7]). Accord-
ingly, the notion of defeasible inference is dened as CDeLPD (hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j hF ;Ri `DeLPD
Ág;Ri.
Argument-based inference: We say that hF ;Ri `DeLPD Á if, and only if, there exists an argument
for Á from the program P = (F [ strict(R); defeasible(R)) (cf. denition 3.1 in [7]). Accord-
ingly, the notion of argument-based inference is dened asCDeLPA (hF ;Ri) = hfÁjhF ;Ri `DeLPA
Ág;Ri.
Warranted inference: We say that hF ;Ri `DeLPD Á if, and only if, there exists a warrant for Á from
the program P = (F [ strict(R); defeasible(R)) (cf. denition 5.2 in [7]). Accordingly, the
notion of warranted inference is dened as CDeLPW (hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j (F ;R) `DeLPW Ág;Ri.
Having instantiated the four abstract entailment relations we turn our attention to the status of cumu-
lativity. The following proposition summarizes our ndings for the rst two relations:
Proposition 1. The consequence operators CDeLPD and CDeLPS satisfy inclusion, idempotence, cut,
and cautious monotonicity.
It is straightforward to see that CDeLPD and C
DeLP
S are both monotonic, and therefore cumulative.
This can be shown by any standard proof of monotonicity from classical logic. It should be mentioned
that the strict part of any defeasible logic program is by denition bound to be consistent with respect
to strict inference (that is, no pair of contradictory literals can be derived).
Regarding argument-based inference, DeLP denes an argument as the set of defeasible rules that
allow us to defeasibly derive a given conclusion. The properties of this inference relation greatly
differ from the previous ones.
Proposition 2. The consequence operator CDeLPA satises inclusion, but fails idempotence, cut, and
cautious monotonicity.
Inclusion trivially holds, given that every fact is supported by the empty argument (note that facts
can always be strictly derived). The failure of idempotence is shown next:2
Example 1. Let P = (¦;¢) be a DeLP program (de:l:p for short), where ¦ = fag and ¢ =
fb ¡Á a; »b ¡Á ag. Let R be the union of both strict and defeasible rules in P . In this case we have
that CDeLPA (hfag;Ri) = hfa; b; »bg;Ri 6= hLit;R) = CDeLPA (CDeLPA (hfag;Ri)).
Finally, the following counterexamples show that argument-based inference does not satisfy cut
nor cautious monotonicity.
Example 2. Let P = (¦;¢) be a de:l:p, where ¦ = fcg and ¢ = fa ¡Á b; b ¡Á »a; »a ¡Á cg. In
this setting, it is possible to build the argument A1 = fb ¡Á »a; »a ¡Á cg for b. However, should b be
added to P as a fact, we now can obtain a new argumentA2 = fa ¡Á bg for a, previously unavailable.
This adds a to the set of argument-based conclusions and therefore cut does not hold.
Example 3. Let P = (¦;¢) be a de:l:p, where ¦ = fag and¢ = fb ¡Á a; »b ¡Á ag. In this context,
the arguments A1 = fb ¡Á ag for b and A2 = f»b ¡Á ag for »b can be constructed from P . However,
should b be added to P as a fact, we can no longer argueA2 (it now contradicts our strict knowledge).
Thus, since A1 was the only argument supporting »b, this previously held conclusion is now lost.
With respect to warranted inferences, we encountered a similar situation:
Proposition 3. The consequence operator CDeLPW satises inclusion but fails idempotence, cut, and
cautious monotonicity.
2for simplicity sake, we shall adopt propositional defeasible rules, despite the fact that these rules represent general
knowledge and, as such, should contain free variables.
To see why CDeLPW satises inclusion note that every fact in a given program is trivially supported
by the empty argument, and that the empty argument cannot be defeated since it is entirely based on
strict information. Regarding idempotence, the following counterexample shows its failure:
Example 4. Let P = (¦;¢) be a de:l:p, where ¦ = fc; a Ã bg and ¢ = fb ¡Á c; »a ¡Á cg. In
this case, two arguments can be built: A1 = fb ¡Á cg for b and A2 = f»a ¡Á cg for »a. Both are
warranted and thus the warranted conclusions from P are fc; »a; bg.
However, as soon as we add these conclusions as new facts into P , we derive the whole Lit (since the
resulting set ¦ of strict knowledge is inconsistent). Formally speaking:
CDeLPW (hfcg;Ri) = hfc; »a; bg;Ri 6= hLit;Ri = CDeLPW (CDeLPW (hfag;Ri))
Finally, we have developed the following counterexamples in order to show the failure of cut and
cautious monotonicity:
Example 5. Let P = (¦;¢) be a de:l:p, where ¦ = fcg and ¢ = fa ¡Á b; c; b ¡Á »a; »a ¡Á cg.
In this setting, it is possible to build an argument A1 = fb ¡Á »a; »a ¡Á cg for b that is a warrant.
However, once b is added to P as a fact, we can obtain a new argument A2 = fa ¡Á b; dg for a,
previously unavailable, that is also a warrant (since argument A3 = f»a ¡Á dg is defeated by A2).
This adds a to the set of warranted conclusions and therefore cut does not hold.
Example 6. Let P = (¦;¢) be a de:l:p, where ¦ = fag and ¢ = fc ¡Á b; b ¡Á a; »c ¡Á ag. The
arguments A1 = fc ¡Á b; b ¡Á ag, A2 = f»c ¡Á ag, and A3 = fb ¡Á ag, supporting respectively
c, »c, and b, can all be built from P . Yet, only »c and b are warranted on the basis of P , since A2
defeats A1, but both A2 and A3 remain undefeated. Finally, should b be added to P as a fact, the new
argument A4 = fc ¡Á bg for c now defeats A2. Thus, since A2 was the only argument for »c, this
previously warranted conclusion is now lost.
3.2 Amgoud and Caminada
Amgoud and Caminada introduced the ASPIC argumentation theory [2], proposing a particular instan-
tiation of Dung's abstract argumentation framework [5], lling the gaps intentionally left unspecied
(namely, the internal structure of arguments). In ASPIC, the knowledge base is a pair T = (S;D)
of sets of strict and defeasible rules. Arguments are constructed chaining recursively both kinds of
rules. Defeat is determined in terms of two kind of attacks: rebuttals (attacks on the ultimate conclu-
sion of an argument), and undercuts (attacks on the intermediate premises). Finally, the acceptability
of these arguments, that is, which arguments survive and which do not, is decided applying one of
Dung's standard semantics. In what follow, we consider whether the four abstract consequence op-
erators instantiated accordingly to the ASPIC formalism satisfy cumulativity. Bear in mind that facts
in this framework are codied as strict rules with empty body. Thus, the set of facts F is composed
by those strict rules with an empty body and the set of rules R is composed by the remaining strict
and defeasible rules. Once again, for a given set Q, the operators strict(Q) and defeasible(Q) return,
respectively, the strict or defeasible rules in Q.
Strict inference: We say that hF ;Ri `ASPICS Á if, and only if, there is a strict argument for Á in the
theory T = (F [ strict(R); defeasible(R)) (cf: denition 8 in [2]). Accordingly, the notion of
strict inference is dened as CASPICS (hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j hF ;Ri `ASPICS Ág;Ri.
Defeasible inference: We say that hF ;Ri `ASPICD Á if, and only if, there is a defeasible argument
for Á in the theory T = (F[strict(R); defeasible(R)) (cf: denition 8 in [2]). Accordingly, the
notion of defeasible inference is dened as CASPICD (hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j hF ;Ri `ASPICD Ág;Ri.
Argument-based inference: We say that hF ;Ri `ASPICA Á if, and only if, there is an argument for
Á in the theory T = (F [ strict(R); defeasible(R)) (cf: denition 7 in [2]). Accordingly, the
notion of defeasible inference is dened as CASPICA (hF ;Ri) = hfÁ j hF ;Ri `ASPICA Ág;Ri.
Warranted inference: We say that hF ;Ri `ASPICW Á if, and only if, Á is a justied conclusion3
that can be obtained from the theory T = (F [ strict(R); defeasible(R)) (cf: denition 12
in [2]). Accordingly, the notion of defeasible inference is dened as CASPICW (hF ;Ri) =
hfÁ j hF ;Ri `ASPICW Ág;Ri.
Note that the ASPIC framework does not distinguish the logical level from the argument level. Also,
the rst three inference relations being all based on the notion of argument emphasize this. However,
since arguments do not impose any restriction upon the derivation that leads to its conclusion, both
self-defeating and non-minimal arguments are allowed (two kind of rather nasty arguments, which can
lead astray the semantics of any formalism). Turning our attention back to the status of cumulativity,
the following proposition summarizes our ndings regarding these entailment relations.
Proposition 4. The consequence operators CASPICS , CASPICD , and CASPICA satisfy inclusion, idem-
potence, cut, and cautious monotonicity.
The previous proposition stems from the fact that all these entailment relations are monotonic.
Warrant inference, in contrast, failed them all.
Proposition 5. The consequence operator CASPICW fails inclusion, idempotence, cut, and cautious
monotonicity.
The failure of inclusion is somewhat surprising, given that this is a fundamental property for
any inference relation. This is a consequence of accepting as valid any arbitrary set of facts, even
inconsistent ones. The following counterexample exploits that:
Example 7. Let T = (S;D) be an ASPIC theory, where S = f! a; ! »ag and D = fg. In this
context, two arguments can be built: P = [! a], and P = [! »a] such that they defeat at each other.
Under, for instance, the stable semantics, there are two extensions: fPg, and fPg. Thus, there are no
justied conclusions (provided that the intersection of these extensions is empty), so inclusion does
not hold.
To show the failure of idempotence we have developed the following counterexample:
Example 8. Let T = (S;D) be an ASPIC theory, where S = f! c; ! d; d ! a; b; c ! »ag and
D = fd ) bg. In this context, ve arguments can be built, P = [! d], Q = [! c], R = [P ! a],
S = [P ) b], and R = [S;Q ! »a]. Note that R is defeated by R and there is no other pair in the
defeat relation (R cannot by defeated by R, since former is strict and the latter is defeasible). In this
example, no matter which semantics we apply, only one extension containing fP;Q;R; Sg exists (cf.
gure 1), thus the resulting set of justied conclusions is fa; b; c; dg.
However, when the inference operator is applied again over this new theory, we obtain a different
result. Note that the set S now contains f! a; ! b; ! c; ! d; b; c ! »a; d ! ag (observe
that both a and b have been added as facts), but the set D remains unchanged. In this new context,
three new arguments can be built: T = [! b], R0 : [! a], and R0 : [T;Q ! »a]. T is not in
conict with any argument, R
0
and R0 defeat each other, and so does R
0
and R, yet R0 defeats R but
R does not defeat R0. As a consequence, there are now two different extensions using once again the
3unless otherwise stated, any of Dung's standard semantics can be used.
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Figure 1: Defeat relations from example 8, before (left) and after (right) adding fa; bg
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Figure 2: Defeat relations from example 9, before (left) and after (right) adding c
stable semantics: fP;Q; S; T; R;R0g and fP;Q; S; T;R;R0g (cf. gure 1). Thus, the set of justied
conclusions is now fb; c; dg, where a, a previously held conclusion is lost. Formally speaking, should
R denotes the union of both strict and defeasible rules in T , we have that:
CASPICW (hfc; dg;Ri) = hfa; b; c; dg;Ri 6= hfb; c; dg;Ri = CASPICW (CASPICW (hfc; dg;Ri))
The next two properties usually require taking advantage of the more advance capabilities of the
formalism, either to prove or disprove it. Regarding ASPIC, we have found that cautious monotonic-
ity does not hold using, luckily enough, the same example as before, since adding all the justied
conclusions as new premises made us loose a, a previously held conclusion.
Finally, we also show that cut does not hold by virtue of the following counterexample:
Example 9. Let T = (S;D) be an ASPIC theory, where S = f! a; ! d; a! »a; »a! b; c; d!
»bg and D = fd ) c; d ) »bg. In this context, seven arguments can be built, Q = [! a],
P = [! d], Q = [Q ! »a], R = [P ) »b], S = [P ) c], R = [Q ! b], and R0 = [S; P ! »b].
Q defeats R, who in turn defeats R and R
0
. Arguments Q and Q defeat at each other, also Q and
R. Moreover, R and Q are self-defeating arguments. Adopting the preferred semantics, the only
extension is fP;Q; Sg (cf. gure 2), and the set of justied conclusion is fa; c; dg.
However, when c is added two new arguments arise: T = [! c] and R00 = [T; P ! »b]. Now R
and R
00
attack each other, hence the only preferred extension is fP;Q; S; T; R;R0; R00g (cf. gure 2).
Finally, since »b is present in every extension, it is a justied conclusion, and thus cut does not hold.
4 Conclusions
In this article we have studied the status of four properties in the context of two well-known for-
malisms for defeasible argumentation. The properties considered were inclusion, idempotence, cut,
and cautious monotonicity, taking into account that the last two let us determine whether the theory
under consideration is cumulative. However, since argumentation frameworks are usually dened fol-
lowing a layered approach, more than one entailment relation is commonly used. In fact, we identied
and formally dened four of them.
The rst argumentation theory we considered was Defeasible Logic Programming. The following
table summarizes our ndings regarding the principles under consideration:
Inclusion Idempotence Cut Cautious M.
CDeLPS
p p p p
CDeLPD
p p p p
CDeLPA
p £ £ £
CDeLPW
p £ £ £
The second argumentation theory we analyzed was the ASPIC framework, with the following table
once again summarizing our ndings:
Inclusion Idempotence Cut Cautious M.
CASPICS
p p p p
CASPICD
p p p p
CASPICA
p p p p
CASPICW £ £ £ £
Briey comparing both tables one result we did not expected quickly becomes apparent: the
properties enjoyed by the corresponding inference relations of the two formalism do not concord.
For instance, CASPICA behaves monotonically (much like C
ASPIC
S and C
ASPIC
D ), but C
DeLP
A evidently
does not. Even more striking is the difference between CDeLPW and C
ASPIC
W , since the former satisfy
inclusion, yet the latter does not. It seems that the denition of the ASPIC formalism still require some
polishing, as pointed out by the failure of such an intuitive and clearly desirable property.
Regarding cumulativity, neither warranted inference in Defeasible Logic Programming nor in the
ASPIC formalism satisfy it. It is interesting to note that in both cases the more rened the inference
relations gets, the less properties it satises. Granted, more complex inference relations are built
using the simpler ones as building blocks. As a result, facts (the building blocks of the lower layer)
do receive a distinctive treatment in these frameworks, so the failure to comply with cumulativity in
both formalisms should not come as a shock according to [11].
Finally, as future work we plan to extend this analysis to other argumentation frameworks using
the same set of abstract inference relations we have identied in this study as common to every theory.
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